Petran Kockelkoren, Wouter Achterberg, Hans Achterhuis, Ko van der Wal

Excerpt from `Environmental Policy in Transformation: a Philosophical Approach' in: The Environment: Towards A Sustainable Future, edited by Dutch Committee for Long-Term Environmental Policy (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)

An assertion which is heard regularly in the discussion about the environmental crisis is that a drastic change of our western, excessively consumptive life style is necessary, if the environmental deterioration is to be kept within bounds. This assertion implies the idea that the attack on the environment cannot be stopped by technical measures only, because these should at least be accompanied by a change in our way of life. However, a change of life style and mentality is an extremely far-reaching and complicated matter. Human behaviour is determined by a multitude of factors, especially when collective behaviour is concerned, as in the present case. Human conduct is after all determined to a great extent by the way in which people understand their situation, i.e. by their conception of themselves, of the reality surrounding them, and of their own place therein. In other words, it is characteristic of human beings that they are interpreting and self-interpreting beings, living within a universe of meanings that help them to find their bearings. Therefore, whoever advocates a change in life style, mentality, etc., advocates a change in the frame of collective meanings within which people live. That demands a lot: systems of meanings crystallise only slowly. Moreover, the comprehensive systems of meanings in terms of which people interpret their existence are only partly understood by themselves.

Some central ideas in the modern frame of reference can indeed be said to have led to the occurrence of an environmental problem. These are in short: mechanisation of the conception of the world, the idea of controllability, and anthropocentrism. These key notions stand in fact for clusters of ideas.

First, the mechanisation of the conception of the world stands for desacralization/profanation/disenchantment of reality, for the central place that the economy takes in `ordinary life' (production and consumption, labour -- things that also affect matrimony and family life). Nature no longer mirrors a cosmic order in which everything has its `natural place'. Consequently, things have no meaning or value in themselves, but receive these only when attributed to them by man.

Secondly, the idea of controllability stands for man's conception of himself as permanently changing, rearranging, revolutionising and shifting the boundaries of the world around him. Reality is conceived as being makeable; as something that can be planned to a great extent. The idea of controllability itself is an inseparable component of the complex of ideas, basic attitudes and operations we want to control; controllability therefore has a self-reinforcing effect which results in an exponential growth of this whole complex. In the corresponding experience of time, the emphasis lies on the future and on progress. Related to this is the modern practical conception of science: the object's knowability is the other side of its being constructable, influenceable, predictable, in contrast to the contemplative conception of pre-modern science. Science is therefore seen as closely related to technology. Thinking is understood as problem-solving activity.

Finally, anthropocentrism stands for the attitude whereby everything is seen in relationship to man, his needs, desires and ideals; in other words, everything serves the self-development of man. Many modern philosophers who express the modern attitude to life, interpret nature and history from the point of view of increasing realisation of human freedom. Freedom is the central moral category of the modern era, both in the negative sense of not being hampered by inner or outer blockages (`being able to do as one pleases'), and in the positive sense of self-determination, autonomy, i.e. gaining freedom and interdependence from the given situation (nature, tradition, etc.) and its prevailing order, which is not one's own.

In a system of orientation in which the above-mentioned groups of ideas are determining components, the rise of an environmental problem is inherent, since in this perspective, reality has been reduced to raw material for human manipulation (in Fichte, for example: "material for duty", i.e. for human self-realisation as a free, moral being). If reality is thus understood as being in itself meaningless (according to Sartre and others even absurd), there is nothing which should be respected or spared for its own sake.

There is no restriction whatsoever `from outside' for human action, except maybe on the human level: the interest or freedom of another human being. And the basic norm of freedom does not give a restriction from within either. Therefore, everything in this frame of orientation points towards an unrestricted command and appropriation of nature, which is stripped of meaning, for the benefit of the unlimited needs and desires of man. MacPherson characterised the self-conception of modern man accordingly with the words: "infinite desirer", "infinite consumer", and "infinite appropriator". As long as this self-interpretation and the corresponding conception of nature and the good persist, pursuing an environmental policy is pointless.

Frames of interpretation cannot be changed at will. We do not have a detached, external relationship to them which is the condition for strategic social manipulation but, rather, an inner one: they are part of what we are ourselves and of what we take for granted in our thoughts and actions. Therefore, they cannot be the object of deliberate, conscious action, at least not directly. That does not mean that no action is possible with regard to such frames, but it is possible only through self-reflection, by asking oneself whether, on further consideration, the prevalent system of orientation expresses credibly and adequately our idea of reality, of ourselves and our standards. Then we do not create a new view on things at will, with brand new convictions, standards, etc., but try to provide a link with experiences and normative intuitions (among other things) which did not fit in the prevalent frame, and which were therefore repressed and obliterated, and for which the means of expression have also crumbled away, although they do still exist.

The task of philosophy with regard to the environmental question should be to describe this domain of marginalized experiences, diffuse norms, etc., and to find means of expression for them, so that they may be recognised and discussed. In this way, philosophy could contribute to a frame of meaning and significance, and in which man understands himself much less in terms of control, as future-oriented, constantly planning, etc. Epistemology, for example, could contribute to a rehabilitation of modes of experiencing reality which are non-technical, i.e. not oriented towards the object's being `makeable' and therefore have a contemplative and participating rather than a detached and objectivistic nature. Finally, notions of the good life would be less anthropocentric. The concept of freedom, for example, which would not and could not be abandoned, would have to be reconsidered and would receive a different place within the moral domain.